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Abstract
Ideas from Fourier analysis have been used in cryptography for the last three decades. Akavia,
Goldwasser and Safra unified some of these ideas to give a complete algorithm that finds significant
Fourier coefficients of functions on any finite abelian group. Their algorithm stimulated a lot of
interest in the cryptography community, especially in the context of “bit security”. This manuscript
attempts to be a friendly and comprehensive guide to the tools and results in this field. The intended
readership is cryptographers who have heard about these tools and seek an understanding of their
mechanics and their usefulness and limitations. A compact overview of the algorithm is presented
with emphasis on the ideas behind it. We show how these ideas can be extended to a “modulus-
switching” variant of the algorithm. We survey some applications of this algorithm, and explain
that several results should be taken in the right context. In particular, we point out that some of the
most important bit security problems are still open. Our original contributions include: a discussion
of the limitations on the usefulness of these tools; an answer to an open question about the modular
inversion hidden number problem.
Keywords: Significant Fourier transform, Goldreich–Levin algorithm, Kushilevitz–Mansour algo-
rithm, bit security of Diffie–Hellman.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Let G be a finite abelian group. Fourier analysis provides a convenient basis for the space of functions
G→ C, namely the characters χ : G→ C. It follows that any function f : G→ C can be represented
as a linear combination f(x) =
∑
α∈G f̂(α)χα(x), where f̂ is the discrete Fourier transform of f . A
standard problem is to approximate a function, up to any error term, using a linear combination of a
small number of characters. This is not always possible, but for certain functions (which are called
concentrated) it is possible. The coefficients in such an approximation are called significant Fourier
coefficients, as their size is large relative to the function’s norm. The simplest example of a concentrated
function is a character itself.
A natural computational problem is to compute such an approximation. When doing this one might
have a complete description of the function or, as will be the case in this paper, just a small set of values
f(xi). The ability to choose specific xi’s plays a crucial role in the ability to approximate f . Indeed,
the main result in this subject is an algorithm that, given the ability to select the values xi, efficiently
computes a sparse approximation for any concentrated function on any abelian group G, by computing
all its significant coefficients. On the other hand, when the xi’s cannot be selected, such an algorithm is
not known to exist in general. Furthermore it is conjectured that an efficient algorithm does not exist in
the general case.
We use the general term significant Fourier transform (SFT) to refer to algorithms that compute a
function’s significant coefficients. SFT algorithms first appear explicitly in the work of Kushilevitz and
Mansour [26], though some of the main ideas already appear in earlier works. Subsequently new algo-
rithms were presented, in various special cases of groups or functions, until the work of Akavia, Gold-
wasser and Safra [3] who presented a generic algorithm for all finite abeliean groups and all complex-
valued functions. The algorithms in the literature are often presented very differently, and some of them
are designed to fulfill a very particular task, but they are all based on the same mathematical principles.
The main aim of this paper is to present a complete study of the SFT algorithms. Our work unifies
these algorithms by clarifying the core mathematics underlying them. Thus, our focus is on a broad
mathematical overview using Fourier analysis on finite groups and elementary group theory. We remark
that our work is not necessarily the best presentation of a specific SFT algorithm, but we believe that
a reader who is interested in understanding the rules and framework of these algorithms would benefit
from this work. Our study also leads to a new approach for some of the more complicated cases.
Furthermore, this paper surveys applications of the SFT algorithm in the field of cryptography and also
gives limitations for such applications.
The SFT algorithm and variants have received great attention in the literature outside the regime
of cryptography. Researchers in engineering, concerned with practical applications in signal process-
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ing, have developed algorithms with greater efficiency (with respect to various metrics); for a recent
survey on these algorithms see Gilbert, Indyk, Iwen and Schmidt [17]. Our work does not cover these
developments.
Roadmap
Section 2 summarises the basic definitions. Section 3 presents the key ideas behind the SFT algo-
rithm, and deals with some related issues. Specifically, with few a examples we explain why being able
to choose the inputs to the functions is essential and why one does not expect to have a similar tool
when the inputs to the functions are chosen at random; In cases where the function values are given by
an oracle, we analyze the case of working with unreliable oracles.
Section 3.1 reviews the development of ideas and highlights the contributions of Goldreich and
Levin [19], Kushilevitz and Mansour [26], Mansour [33], Bleichenbacher [8] and Akavia, Goldwasser
and Safra [3].
In Section 4 we outline our recent work [28] on applying modulus switching to this subject (namely
to re-cast a function on Zp to a function on Z2n for the nearest power of 2 to p). These ideas are
very similar to the approach taken in Shor’s (period-finding) algorithm [42]. The benefit of this new
approach is twofold. Firstly, its analysis gives insights into the AGS algorithm. Secondly it provides a
new approach for implementations and for proving concentration of functions. In particular we provide
a new proof of a result by Morillo and Ra`fols [38] (described in Section 4.1).
The SFT algorithm is a useful tool in the research area of bit security. Section 5 surveys bit security
applications using the language of the hidden number problem: given f and oracle access to fs := f◦ϕs,
for some function ϕ parameterized by an unknown value s, recover the value s. The main application
is in the group G = Zp for the particular function ϕs(x) = sx (mod p), i.e. fs := f(sx). In this
particular case the scaling property gives f̂s(α) = f̂(αs
−1) for every α ∈ G. It follows that f and fs
share the same coefficients in different order. If α is a significant Fourier coefficient of f and β is a
significant Fourier coefficient of fs then αβ
−1 is a candidate value for s.
Using this observation, Akavia, Goldwasser and Safra [3] showed that a number of bit security
results (for RSA, Rabin, and discrete logs) can be re-proved using these tools. A classic result of
this type, from Alexi, Chor, Goldreich and Schnorr (ACGS) [4], is that if one has an oracle that on
input xe (mod N) (where (N, e) is an RSA public key) returns the least significant bit of x with
probability noticeably better than 12 , then one can compute e-th roots modulo N . Ha˚stad and Na¨slund
[24] generalized this result for an oracle that returns any single bit of x (see also [20, Section 4.1]), but
their method is very complex and requires complicated and adaptive manipulations of the bits. On the
other hand, the algorithm given by AGS, which applies to functions with significant Fourier coefficients,
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is much clearer and is not adaptive.1 Similar to Ha˚stad and Na¨slund, Morillo and Ra`fols [38] extended
the AGS results to all single bit functions, by showing that each single bit function is concentrated and
so has a significant Fourier coefficient (in particular, one can obtain the ACGS result for any bit). The
SFT algorithm has also been used to show search-to-decision reductions for the learning with errors
and learning with rounding problems [36, 9].
Subsequently, a number of papers [14, 15, 16, 49] have proved (or re-proved) various results on bit
security in the context of Diffie–Hellman keys on elliptic curves and finite fields Fpn with n > 1, but
these results consider an unconventional model that allows changing the curve or field representation.
We emphasize that the requirement of chosen inputs for the functions restricts these applications. In-
deed, the question of main interest, whether single bits of Diffie–Hellman shared keys are hardcore in a
fixed representation, is still open. We elaborate on these applications in Section 5.
Section 6 explains a fundamental limitation to the approach described above: we prove that one
can only solve the (chosen-multiplier) hidden number problem with these tools when the function ϕs
is linear or affine. Therefore, these tools cannot be directly used to address the elliptic curve hidden
number problem or the modular inversion hidden number problem. Our work therefore answers a
question in [32].
2. PRELIMINARIES
The following gives mathematical background needed to understand the paper and definitions that will
be used throughout the paper. The main definitions and notation appear in the table in Section 2.4.
2.1 Fourier analysis on finite groups
We review basic background on Fourier analysis on discrete domains. Proofs and further details can be
found in Terras [47].
Let (R,+, ·) be a finite ring and denote by G := (R,+) the corresponding additive abelian group.
We are interested in the set of functions L2(R) := {f : R→ C}. The setL2(R) is a vector space overC
of dimension|R|, with the usual pointwise addition and scalar multiplication of functions. Convolution
of two functions f, g ∈ L2(R) is defined by (f ∗ g)(x) = 1|R|
∑
y∈R f(x− y)g(y). The expectation of
a function f ∈ L2(R) is defined to be E [f ] = 1|R|
∑
x∈R f(x). The space L
2(R) is equipped with an
inner product 〈f, g〉 := E
[
f(x)g(x)
]
= 1|R|
∑
x∈R f(x)g(x), where z denotes the complex conjugate
of z ∈ C. The inner product induces a norm ‖f‖2 =
√〈f, f〉. We also define ‖f‖∞ = maxx∈R |f(x)|.
One basis for this vector space is the set of Kronecker delta functions {δi}i∈R
(
δi(j) = 1 if j = i,
otherwise δi(j) = 0
)
. This is an orthogonal basis with respect to the inner product. However, this basis
1We describe the notion of adaptiveness in Section 5.
5
is not as useful as the Fourier basis, as we will explain later in this section.
A character of an additive groupG is a group homomorphism taking values in the non-zero complex
numbers, namely χ : G→ C∗ such that χ(x+y) = χ(x)χ(y). Since χ(x)|G| = χ(|G| x) = χ(0G) = 1,
we see that the characters take values in the complex |G|-th roots of unity. The set of characters of G
forms a group (with respect to pointwise multiplication), isomorphic to G, which is often denoted Ĝ.
In general, we fix a choice of isomorphism G → Ĝ and denote it by α 7→ χα. In particular, for
G = ZN the characters are defined by χα(x) := e
2pii
N
αx where α ∈ G. For G = ZN1 × . . . × ZNm ,
let α = (α1, . . . , αm) and x = (x1, . . . , xm); the character χα is given by χα(x) := χα1(x1) · . . . ·
χαm(xm) = e
2pii
N1
α1x1 · . . . · e 2piiNmαmxm and the map α 7→ χα from G to Ĝ is an isomorphism. We
sometimes write ωN := e
2pii
N so that χα(x) = ω
αx
N .
The following relations are standard and can be used to show that the characters are orthonormal
∑
x∈G
χ(x) =
|G| if χ is the identity in Ĝ,0 otherwise, ∑
χ∈Ĝ
χ(x) =
|G| if x = 0,0 otherwise.
If G = ZN1 × . . .× ZNm then for any subgroup H ≤ G we define the orthogonal set
H⊥ := {a ∈ G | χa(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H} . (1)
This set is fundamental for the understanding of the SFT algorithm and appears frequently in Section
3.2. Using the relations above it can be shown that
∑
h∈H
χh(x) =
|H|, if x ∈ H⊥,0, otherwise. (2)
The Fourier basis for L2(R) is the set Ĝ consisting of all the characters χ. It is an orthonormal
basis. Therefore, we can represent each function f : R → C uniquely as a linear combination f(x) =∑
α∈G f̂(α)χα(x) of the characters χα. The function f̂ : G → C given by f̂(α) = 〈f, χα〉 is called
the discrete Fourier transform. The map f 7→ f̂(α) is C-linear. Notice that a single Fourier coefficient
encapsulates information about the function on the whole domain, unlike the representation in terms of
Kronecker delta functions where one coefficient only holds information about the function at a single
point.
Parseval’s identity is the following relationship between the norms of f and f̂ :
‖f‖22 =
1
|G|
∑
x∈G
|f(x)|2 = 〈f, f〉 =
∑
α∈G
|f̂(α)|2 = |G| · ‖f̂‖22 .
Adopting signal-processing terminology, when we work with the values f(x) for x ∈ G we say
that x is in the time domain. When we use the values f̂(α) we say α ∈ G is in the frequency domain.
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There does not seem to be a rigorous formulation of this terminology and we do not use it much, but the
reader will find it very common in the engineering literature. We signal to the reader whether we are
working in the time domain or frequency domain by using Latin letters x, y for elements in the former
(elements of G), and Greek letters α, β for the latter (corresponding to elements of Ĝ, e.g. χα).
Let R = ZN1 × . . .× ZNm with componentwise addition and multiplication, and let f, g ∈ L2(R).
Basic properties of the Fourier transform include the following (note that the basis of Kronecker delta
functions does not satisfy these properties, which is one reason why it is less useful than the Fourier
basis):
• (time) scaling: if g(x) := f(cx) for c ∈ R∗, then ĝ(α) = f̂(c−1α);
• (time) shifting: if g(x) := f(c+ x) for c ∈ R, then ĝ(α) = f̂(α)χα(c);
• (frequency) shifting: if g(x) := f(x)χc(x) for c ∈ R, then ĝ(α) = f̂(α− c);
• convolution-multiplication duality: f̂ ∗ g(α) = f̂(α)ĝ(α).
We now recall some definitions from [3, 14, 38]. The same definitions can be made for functions
over rings R where G is their additive group.
Definition 1 (Restriction). Given a function f : G → C and a set of characters Γ ⊆ Ĝ, the restriction
of f to Γ is the function f |Γ : G→ C defined by f |Γ :=
∑
χα∈Γ
f̂(α)χα.
Definition 2 (ǫ-Concentration). Let ǫ > 0 be a real number. A family of functions {fi : Gi → C}i∈N
is Fourier ǫ-concentrated if there exists a polynomial P and sets of characters Γi ⊆ Ĝi such that
|Γi| ≤ P (log |Gi|) and ‖fi − fi|Γi‖22 ≤ ǫ for all i ∈ N.
Definition 3 (Concentration). A family of functions {fi : Gi → C}i∈N is Fourier concentrated if there
exists a polynomial P and sets of characters Γi ⊆ Ĝi such that |Γi| ≤ P (log |Gi|/ǫ) and ‖fi−fi|Γi‖22 ≤
ǫ for all i ∈ N and for all ǫ > 0.
Most applications are concerned with a single function that implicitly defines the entire family.
In this case we informally say that the function, instead of the family, is concentrated. Examples of
concentrated functions, and of this terminology, are given in Example 5.
Definition 4 (Heavy coefficient). For a function f : G → C and a threshold τ > 0, we say that a
coefficient f̂(α) (of the character χα) is τ -heavy if |f̂(α)|2 > τ .
By Parseval’s identity it is evident the number of τ -heavy coefficients for a function f : G→ C is at
most ‖f‖22/τ (see [26, Lemma 3.4] or [34, Lemma 4.8]). Thus, the cases of interest are where the latter
value is polynomial in log(|G|), so there are at most polynomially many τ -heavy coefficients. This
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forces τ to be relatively large to ‖f‖2, e.g. τ = ‖f‖2/poly(log(|G|)). We remark that it might have
been better to define a τ -heavy coefficient to satisfy |f̂(α)|2 > τ‖f‖22, however we keep the notion
that is mostly used in the literature (as we show below most applications consider the specific case
‖f‖22 = 1).
The phrases significant coefficient and heavy coefficient are often used interchangeably to mean any
coefficient f̂(α) which is large relative to the norm of the function, but without reference to any specific
value of τ . In this paper our convention is to use “heavy” in a formal sense and “significant” in an
informal sense.
The relationship between concentrated functions and functions with significant coefficients is subtle.
If a function has a τ -heavy coefficient, then it is (1−τ)-concentrated (with |Γ| = 1). But such a function
is not necessarily ǫ-concentrated for all ǫ. The literature has tended to focus on concentrated functions,
but for many of the bit security applications it is sufficient that the function has one or more significant
coefficients. The distinction is important since it is harder to prove that a function is concentrated than
to prove it has a significant coefficient.
Example 5. Here are some examples of functions with significant coefficients, most of which are con-
centrated:
• A single character is concentrated; that is, the family {χα : Zn → C}n>α for some α ∈ N is
concentrated. The case α = 0 corresponds to constant functions, which are concentrated but will
be un-interesting in our applications.
• For the least-significant-bit function LSB(x) on Z2n , which gives the parity of x, the functions
f : Z2n → C given by f(x) := (−1)LSB(x) are concentrated. Indeed, these functions correspond
to the characters f(x) = (−1)x = ω2n−1x2n = χ2n−1(x).
• The functions half : ZN → {−1, 1}, for which half(x) = 1 if 0 ≤ x < N2 and half(x) =
−1 otherwise, are concentrated; one has ĥalf(α) = 1N [
∑
0≤x<N
2
χα(x) −
∑
N
2
≤x<N χα(x)].
Elementary arguments (see Claim 11 below) show that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
∑
0≤x<N
2
χα(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
∑
0≤x<N
2
ω−αxN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
1
||α|N |
where |α|N denotes the unique integer in (−N/2, N/2] that is congruent to α modulo N . Simi-
larly
∣∣∣ 1N ∑N
2
≤x<N χα(x)
∣∣∣ < 1||α|N | . These results can be used to show that half is concentrated
on a set of characters α with small ||α|N |; See [3, Claim 4.1]. Similar arguments hold for the
most-significant-bit function f(x) := (−1)MSB(x), thus it is also concentrated.
8
• For primes p, the functions f : Zp → C given by f(x) := (−1)LSB(x) are concentrated. This
follows from f(x) = half(2−1x) and the scaling property.
• The function LPNs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, given by LPNs(x) = (−1)〈x,s〉+e(x) for e which is mostly
0 (and otherwise 1), has a significant coefficient and therefore is ǫ-concentrated (for some large
ǫ). Let I be the set for which e(x) = 1, then L̂PNs(s) =
1
2n
∑
x/∈I 1 +
1
2n
∑
x∈I(−1) = 1− 2|I|2n .
Since the size |I| is relatively small, the coefficient L̂PNs(s) is large, that is, the function LPNs
“behaves” like the character χs in {0, 1}n . If |I| is very small, for example |I| = poly(log |G|),
then LPNs is also concentrated. Moreover, one can show that |L̂PNs(v)| ≤ |I|2n , and on average
is expected to be proportional to
√
2|I|/2n(2n − 1) ≈√2|I|/2n.
• ‘Noisy characters’ given by f(x) := ωαx+e(x)p for some suitable random functions e have a
significant coefficient f̂(α) as we show in Section 6.1. An example of such a noisy character is
the function LWEs : Z
n
p → Zp, given by LWEs(x) = ω〈x,s〉+e(x)p for e(x) drawn from a Gaussian
distribution.
Another example of concentrated functions are the i-th bit functions, see Section 4.1 for details.
2.2 Learning model
Let f : R → C be a function for which one wants to learn its significant coefficients. The learner gets
access to samples of the form (x, f(x)). In the random access model the learner receives polynomially
many samples for inputs x ∈ R drawn independently and uniformly at random. As opposed to this
model, in the query access model the learner can query the function on any chosen input x ∈ R to
receive the corresponding sample.
A learning algorithm for a function f : G → C outputs a set containing all the significant Fourier
coefficients of f . Formally, given a function f and ǫ, δ > 0, the algorithm outputs a set Γ of size
polynomial in log(|G|) and ǫ−1, such that ‖f − f |Γ‖22 ≤ ǫ with probability at least 1− δ.
The main result of this subject (see Theorem 7 below) is that there is a randomised polynomial-time
algorithm to compute a sparse approximation f |Γ to a concentrated function in the query access model.
In other words, concentrated functions admit a polynomial-time learning algorithm in the query access
model.
2.3 Probability
The Chernoff bound gives an upper bound on the probability that a sum of independent random vari-
ables deviates from its expected value. One can therefore derive a lower bound for the number of
samples needed to estimate the sum of independent random variables, with any required probability
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and error term. For a random variable X on a set A ⊆ C we denote by Ex∈AX(x) the expected value∑
x∈AX(x) Pr(x).
Theorem 6 (Chernoff). Let A be a set of complex numbers such that |x| ≤ M for all x ∈ A. Let
xi ∈ A be chosen independently and uniformly at randomly from A. Then
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ex∈A[x]− 1m
m∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > λ
 ≤ 2e−λ2m/2M2 .
2.4 Table of notations
We summarize the main notation and definitions in the following table.
Notation/Definition Meaning
ωn The complex n-th root of unity e
2pii/n.
χ A character of G.
H⊥ The orthogonal set {α ∈ G | χα(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H}.
f̂ The Fourier transform of f .
Scaling property ĝ(α) = f̂(c−1α) for g(x) := f(cx) and c ∈ R∗.
τ -heavy coefficient A coefficient satisfying |f̂(α)|2 > τ .
Significant coefficient A τ -heavy coefficient, for some τ−1 = poly(log |G|, ‖f‖∞).
Query access The ability to ask for f(x) for any input x.
3. CLARIFICATIONS: PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING SFT ALGORITHMS
In the last few decades several significant Fourier transform (SFT) algorithms were proposed in the
literature in several scientific areas. The early algorithms treat specific functions, while the later algo-
rithms apply to classes of functions. The principles underlying these algorithms come from elementary
group theory. The aim of this section is to clarify the rules that govern these algorithms. Our analysis
gives a unified presentation for all of these algorithms, which we believe brings clarity to the literature
and will be more accessible to non-experts.
A precise statement of what an SFT algorithm does is given in Theorem 7. Section 3.1 gives an
overview of the earlier algorithms. Section 3.2 presents the unified SFT algorithm in the query access
model. The section starts with a high-level presentation of the SFT algorithm. We then describe the
algorithm with a focus on the required algebraic relations between the queries, thus explaining the need
for query access. For these relations to arise, the function’s domain needs to be “highly composite”,
i.e. to contain many subgroups. We give examples of the requirement on the queries in some specific
domains. We then turn to an analysis of the algorithm on domains of prime order. Moreover, the
original approach that we present in Section 4 gives further insights on the connections between the
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different domains. We finish this section with two short descriptions. Section 3.3 discusses cases where
some of the function’s outputs (i.e. the algorithm’s inputs) are “noisy”, that is where the actual values
are replaced with some other values. Section 3.4 explains why an SFT algorithm in the random access
model is unlikely to exist.
Theorem 7 ([1, SFT algorithm][3, Theorem 5]). Let G be an abelian group represented by a set of
generators of known orders. There is a learning algorithm that, given query access to a function
f : G→ C, a threshold τ > 0 and δ > 0, outputs a list L of size at most 2‖f‖22/τ such that
• L contains all the τ -heavy Fourier coefficients of f with probability at least 1− δ;
• L does not contain coefficients that are not (τ/2)-heavy with probability at least 1− δ.
The algorithm runs in polynomial time in log
(|G|), ‖f‖2∞/τ and log (1δ).
3.1 History and special cases
Key ideas behind the SFT algorithm first arose in other settings, and the aim of this section is to put
some of this early work in context. This section is not needed in order to understand the SFT algorithm.
Readers who are mainly interested in understanding the general SFT algorithm should feel free to skip
this section and go straight to Section 3.2.
3.1.1 Goldreich–Levin
Consider a ‘noisy’ inner product function fs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} given by fs(x) = 〈x, s〉 + δ(x)
(addition takes place mod 2) where δ(x) = 1 with some small probability (noticeably smaller than 1/2)
and otherwise δ(x) = 0. This is the same function as in the well-known learning parity with noise
(LPN) problem. The task is to learn s given samples fs(xi).
The connection to the Fourier basis can be seen by reformulating the problem as follows. Define
g : {0, 1}n → {−1, 1} by g(x) = (−1)fs(x) = (−1)〈x,s〉+δ(x). Notice that when δ ≡ 0 then g is in
fact the character χs(x) = (−1)〈x,s〉. The fact that δ(x) = 0 on most inputs guarantees that ĝ(s) is a
significant Fourier coefficient for g, as shown in Example 5.
In the random access model, where one gets arbitrary samples, LPN is considered to be a hard
computational problem (unless δ(x) = 0 for all, or almost all, x; then reconstructing fs is an easy
linear algebra problem). Goldreich and Levin [19] (GL) considered this problem in the query access
model, and gave an efficient algorithm to solve it as we briefly explain. In the simplest setting there is
a single τ -heavy coefficient for τ > 1/2.
If one can choose the queries for fs then an elementary approach is to query on the unit vectors
e1 := (1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , en := (0, . . . , 0, 1) to learn s bit-by-bit. However, since the query on ei may
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return the answer 〈ei, s〉 + 1, one would like to generate a small set of independent values of the form
〈ei, s〉 + δ, and determine si by majority rule, as δ = 0 with probability noticeably greater than 1/2.
This can simply be achieved by querying on correlated values x and x+ei to get the results 〈x, s〉+δ(x)
and 〈x, s〉+ 〈ei, s〉+ δ(x+ ei). If both answers are not noisy (or if both are noisy) then by subtracting
one from the other we get 〈ei, s〉, which is the i-th coordinate of s. (For the interested reader: if the
noise rate is at least 1/4, then there may not be a unique solution (see Section 3.3); Rackoff (see [18,
Section C.2]) suggested to use a trick due to Alexi et al. [4] to deal with this case.)
The original Goldreich–Levin paper [19] does not give a clear description of the learning algorithm.
A description in the language of Fourier analysis was given in [26] by Kushilevitz and Mansour.
3.1.2 Bleichenbacher
Bleichenbacher [8] seems to have been the first to consider these problems in the case of functions on
ZN where N is not a power of 2. He considers a ‘noisy’ product function fs : ZN → ZN given by
fs(x) = sx + δ(x) where |δ(x)| < N2λ , for some real number λ, with probability (noticeably) greater
than 1/2. This is usually viewed as outputting about λ most significant bits of the product sx ∈ ZN ,
as sx and fs differ by a small number. The task, as before, is to learn s given samples fs(xi). The
connection to the Fourier basis can be seen by reformulating the problem as done in the previous GL
case – see the ‘noisy character’ case in Example 5.
This problem is in fact the hidden number problem that was considered in [11] and which we
further discuss in Section 5. Notice that if one can obtain any query, then this problem can be solved
by successively multiplying by 2 to read the bits of s. Since some samples may be erroneous, majority
rule is used, similar to the approach taken in the GL case. Moreover if δ(x) is very small, finding s and
reconstructing fs is easy (by ranging over all possible values for δ).
Bleichenbacher’s original setting takes place in the random access model, so he gives a method (not
efficient for large domains) to obtain samples fs(x) for which x lie in short intervals, and then gives a
method to solve the original problem. We explain the latter method. Here however, one is not assumed
to have any chosen query, but only that the queries lie in some (designated) intervals.
The main idea to solve this problem comes from the fact that one can use small (but gradually
increasing) multipliers, not necessary powers of 2, to learn the bits of s. This comes from the following
observation: if s < N2η , for some η ≥ 0, then sy < N for every 0 ≤ y ≤ 2η. In other words, the product
sy does not ‘wrap-around’ the modulus N .
The latter observation can be used to determine upper bits of s: given y and fs(y) = sy+δ(y), take
⌊fs(y)/y⌉ = ⌊s+ δ(y)/y⌉; assuming there is no wrap-around over N in fs(y), we get some upper bits
of s. For example, if 2η−1 ≤ y ≤ 2η , then |δ(y)/y| < N
2η+λ−1
so we roughly learn λ − 1 of the upper
bits of s that were not already known.
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Now suppose one knows MSBρ(s), the ρmost significant bits of s, then by subtracting it from s we
have s′ := s−MSBρ(s) < N2ρ . The goal now is to learn further (upper) bits of s′. One can define fs′(y)
to be fs(y) −MSBρ(s)y = sy −MSBρ(s)y + δ(y) = s′y + δ(y). Thus, for appropriate multiplier y,
say 2ρ−1 ≤ y ≤ 2ρ, we can determine more upper bits of s′ as above. Repeating this procedure, one
eventually learns all bits of s.
Notice that this approach requires having multipliers drawn from some interval {0, 1, . . . , 2i − 1}
(specifically small multipliers in the first stages, which are the ‘hardest’ to get). Moreover, since it is
not always the case that |δ(x)| < N
2λ
, we need to generate independent multipliers from these intervals.
Similar to the approach in the GL case, this is done by fixing some z and querying on z+ r for r chosen
uniformly in {0, 1, . . . , 2i − 1}, then subtracting. Thus the queries have to be correlated such that their
difference lies in the required interval.
This description presents the core ideas behind Bleichenbacher’s algorithm in a manner similar to
the description of the GL algorithm above. Bleichenbacher’s description, which involves terminology
from Fourier analysis, resembles the Kushilevitz–Mansour modification to the GL algorithm (see be-
low) and the ideas described in Section 4. For the full details we refer to Bleichenbacher [8] (see also
Section 6.1 below). This method does not seem to have been used for cryptographic applications until
the recent works [13, 5].
3.1.3 Following work
The early work did not explicitly mention Fourier coefficients, but it was realised that one can re-phrase
the problems as finding significant Fourier coefficients of related functions, as we show above. The
Goldreich–Levin case was generalized by Kushilevitz and Mansour [26] (KM) to any real-valued func-
tion over {0, 1}n and this work was the first to explicitly treat functions with more than one significant
Fourier coefficient.
Subsequently, Mansour [33] gave an algorithm for functions f : Z2n → C. Unlike other works,
Mansour’s algorithms computes the significant coefficients from the least significant bit to the most
significant bit (a link between these works [26, 33] is explained in Remark 9 below). The approach of
Mansour was extended, thereby giving a generalisation of Bleichenbacher’s result, by Akavia, Gold-
wasser and Safra [3] (AGS).
Notice that combining the KM and AGS ideas gives an algorithm for all groups ZN1 × · · · × ZNr ,
since one can easily collapse from the latter to ZNj (by choosing appropriate queries, for example
queries of the form r · ej for desired values r ∈ ZNj ). Therefore, the case of most interest is G = Zp
which we present below. As further evidence for the unity of all these ideas we remark that the KM and
AGS algorithms query on exactly the same set of queries as GL and Bleichenbacher (and subsequently
reveal the significant coefficients bit-by-bit from MSB to the LSB).
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3.2 The SFT algorithm
Let f : G → C. Given a threshold τ ∈ R, the algorithm outputs all τ -heavy Fourier coefficients of f
(and potentially some other τ/2-heavy coefficients) with overwhelming probability.
We first give a high-level view of how the algorithm works. The method is a form of binary search:
the algorithm divides the set of Fourier coefficients into two (disjoint) sets, say A and B, and checks
each set separately to determine whether it potentially contains a τ -heavy coefficient. To do this the
algorithm defines two new functions, one for each set of coefficients. A clever use of Parseval’s identity
allows the algorithm to check the size of all coefficients in each set simultaneously, given the norm of
each function. Hence, the task is to determine the norms of the two new functions, which requires a
method to compute the function outputs. The structure of the sets A,B is important: for some sets we
have useful formulas to compute the functions at required values. Instead of precisely calculating these
values, it is sufficient to have approximations of the outputs of the functions and to approximate the
norm of each function. The Chernoff bound is then used to bound the error term in the approximations.
Schematically, the algorithm operates as follows, where we initially take D = G:
• Partition D = A ∪B, and define fA(x) :=
∑
α∈A f̂(α)χα(x) and fB(x) :=
∑
β∈B f̂(β)χβ(x).
• Approximate the values fA(xi) and fB(yj) for polynomially many samples xi, yj , chosen uni-
formly at random. This is done using the fundamental relation in (3) below.
• Using the values from the previous step, approximate the norms ||fA||22 and ||fB||22. See (5).
• Using Parseval’s identity ||fA||22 =
∑
α∈A |f̂(α)|2, if the approximation of the norm is smaller
than2 34τ then with overwhelming probability f does not have a τ -heavy coefficient in A. Hence,
dismiss A. Act similarly for fB.
• Run the algorithm recursively on the remaining sets and stop when it reaches singletons.
Remark 8. We emphasize that the algorithm can work with any function f and with any threshold
τ . Specifically, if f does not have any τ -heavy coefficients, then the algorithm will output an empty
list. However, the running time is polynomial in ‖f‖2∞/τ so the algorithm will not be efficient if the
threshold is chosen to be too low.
3.2.1 Domains of size 2n
We now sketch an algorithm that unifies the KM and Mansour algorithms. Our presentation is more
group-theoretic than the original works. We refer to [26] and [34] for exact details and proofs.
2A lower threshold 3
4
τ is needed since the algorithm only approximates the norm. As a consequence, the final list may
contain coefficients that are τ
2
-heavy but not τ -heavy.
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Let f : G→ C and τ ∈ R. At each iteration the algorithm takes a set D (starting withD = G) and
proceeds as follows.
Partial functions. Partition D = A ∪· B into two sets that are defined below. Define the function
fA : G → C by fA(x) =
∑
α∈A f̂(α)χα(x). If f has a τ -heavy coefficient α and α ∈ A, then fA has
a τ -heavy coefficient. All arguments hold similarly for the set B.
Estimating fA(x). We need a method to estimate values of the function fA using values of the original
function f . We define a filter function hA : G→ C by h(x) =
∑
α∈A χα(x), and then use the property
f̂ ∗ hA = f̂ · ĥA. Since
ĥA(α) =
{
1 α ∈ A,
0 otherwise,
we have
f̂ ∗ hA(α) =
{
f̂(α) α ∈ A,
0 otherwise.
In other words,
f ∗ hA = fA . (3)
Convolution is not a task we have an efficient method to calculate in general, let alone efficiently
calculating hA(x) =
∑
α∈A χα(x). Therefore, the structure of the sets is important and plays a key role
in the ability to apply the algorithm. Notice that if A is an arithmetic progression, then
∑
α∈A χα(x) =∑
j χqj+r(x) = χr(x)
∑
j χq(jx), and so it can be evaluated by the formula for geometric series. More
generally, assume D ≤ G is a subgroup and let H ≤ D be a subgroup (of index 2). We take A to be a
coset A = z +H for some z ∈ G (then B is taken to be the other coset). Then,
hz+H(x) =
∑
h∈H
χz+h(x) =
∑
h∈H
χz(x)χh(x) = χz(x)
∑
h∈H
χh(x) ,
and the latter is zero unless x ∈ H⊥ (H⊥ is defined in (1) above). Thus the function hA is given by
hA(x) = hz+H(x) =
χz(x) · |H|, if x ∈ H⊥,0, otherwise. (4)
We therefore get, since |H||H⊥| = |G|,
fA(x) = f ∗ hA(x) = E
y∈G
[
f(x− y)hA(y)
]
=
1
|G|
∑
y∈G
f(x− y)hA(y)
=
1
|G| |H|
∑
y∈H⊥
f(x− y)χz(y) = E
y∈H⊥
[
f(x− y)χz(y)
]
.
Estimating ‖fA‖2. We can now write ‖fA‖2 as
‖fA‖22 = E
x∈G
∣∣(f ∗ hA)(x)∣∣2 = E
x∈G
∣∣∣∣ Ey∈G [f(x− y)hA(y)]
∣∣∣∣2 = Ex∈G
∣∣∣∣∣ Ey∈H⊥ [f(x− y)χz(y)]
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
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Again, an approximation of the norm is sufficient (a consequence of the approximation is that we have
to lower the threshold τ a little bit).
We can therefore approximate ‖fA‖22 by choosing m1,m2 sufficiently large (given by the Chernoff
bound), randomly choosing3 xi ∈ G where 1 ≤ i ≤ m1, randomly choosing yij ∈ H⊥ for each i
where 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 and calculating
1
m1
m1∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1m2
m2∑
j=1
f(xi − yij)χz(yij)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≈ ‖fA‖22 =
∑
α∈A
|f̂(α)|2. (5)
One then checks if this value is smaller than 3τ/4. If so then with overwhelming probability there
is no α ∈ A such that f̂(α) is τ -heavy, and so the set A can be dismissed. Notice that if this value is
greater than 3τ/4 it does not necessarily mean that A contains a significant coefficient. In this case the
algorithm sets D = A and repeats until all sets are singletons or dismissed.
We give the pseudocode of the algorithm. At start, set z = 0 and k = n, soHk = G.
Algorithm 1:MainProcedure
Input: A coset z +Hk.
if |Hk| = 1 then
if |Est f̂(z)|2 ≥ 3τ/4 then
return {z}
else
return ∅
else
LetW be a set of coset representatives for Hk−1 in Hk
LetW ′ = {w ∈W | EstNormSq(f(z+w)+Hk−1) ≥ 3τ/4}
return ∪w∈W ′ MainProcedure((z + w) +Hk−1)
Algorithm 2: EstNormSq
Input: fz+H : G→ C.
Choose xi ∈ G where 1 ≤ i ≤ m1
For each i, choose yij ∈ H⊥ where 1 ≤ j ≤ m2
return 1m1
∑m1
i=1
∣∣∣ 1m2 ∑m2j=1 f(xi − yij)χz(yij)∣∣∣2
Algorithm 3: Estf̂
Input: z ∈ G.
Choose xi ∈ G where 1 ≤ i ≤ m1
return 1m1
∑m1
i=1 f(xi)χz(−xi)
3Note that as in [26, 33] one can define the function fA over H (and not G), and therefore choose the values xi fromH .
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3.2.2 Examples
Notice that in (5) above for each xi one needs the samples f(xi− yij). This explains the importance of
having query access to the function. To illustrate this point, we give some concrete examples.
Kushilevitz and Mansour [26] consider a function f : {0, 1}n → R. Write x = x1 . . . xn. At the
first iteration define A to contain all n-bit strings that start with 0 and B to contain all the n-bit strings
that start with 1. Then we have
hA(x) =
2n−1, if x = 0 . . . 0 or x = 10 . . . 0,0, otherwise, (6)
and indeed
ĥA(α) =
1
2n
∑
x
hA(x)(−1)〈α,x〉 = 1
2
(
(−1)0 + (−1)α1
)
=
{
1 α ∈ A;
0 otherwise.
One can only evaluate f ∗ hA(x) if one has the values f(x) and f(x + e1). This shows that the KM
approach requires (in the first iteration) queries on pairs of vectors that differ by a unit vector, exactly
as in the elementary approach to the GL theorem as sketched in Section 3.1.1.
Mansour [33] considers a function f : Z2n → C. At the first iteration define A to contain all the
even numbers in Z2n and B to contain all the odd numbers. Then, we have
hA(x) =
2n−1, if x = 0 or x = 2n−1,0, otherwise, (7)
and indeed
ĥA(α) =
1
2n
∑
x
hA(x)ω
αx
2n =
1
2
(
1 + (−1)α) = { 1 α ∈ A;
0 otherwise.
One can only evaluate f ∗ hA(x) if one has f(x) and f(x+ 2n−1).
The analysis of this algorithm is useful for the prime case below, and so we present its later stages.
In stage l of this algorithm, one defines the subgroup H to contain all multiples of 2l in Z2n . Hence the
cosets used to partition the solution space contain all numbers that agree on their remainder modulo 2l,
and H⊥ = {x ∈ Z2n | x2l ≡ 0 (mod 2n)} = {0, 2n−l, 2 · 2n−l, 3 · 2n−l, . . . , (2l − 1)2n−l}. Define
A = Ar = {x ∈ Z2n | x ≡ r (mod 2l)} = H + r. Then, the filter function hA satisfies
hA(x) =
χr(x) · 2n−l, if x ∈ H⊥,0, otherwise. (8)
Again, to approximate f ∗ hA(x), one needs enough samples f(xi) for xi ∈ H⊥.
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Remark 9. Readers familiar with lattice cryptography may be interested to know that the idea that
underlies the modulus-dimension tradeoff [29] already appears in the relationship between the KM [26]
algorithm on {0, 1}n and the Mansour [33] algorithm on Z2n . We briefly sketch this idea. Let a =
(a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ Znp , s = (s0, . . . , sn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n , and suppose
b ≡ a · s + e ≡
n−1∑
i=0
aisi + e (mod p) .
Writing a = a0p
n−1 + a1p
n−2 + · · · + an−2p+ an−1 and s = s0 + s1p+ · · · + sn−1pn−1 we have
as ≡ (a0s0 + · · ·+ an−1sn−1)pn−1 + lower term (mod pn)
and some of its MSBs agree with the MSBs of bpn−1, when p is large.
As shown in equation (6) above, at the first iteration over {0, 1}n the filter function is nonzero on
the inputs 0 and a = (1, 0, . . . , 0) in Zn2 . These vectors correspond to the values a = 0 and a = 2
n−1
in Z2n , which are exactly the values appearing in equation (7). Since the lower terms of a · s are zero,
when a = 0, pn−1, the MSB of as and bpn−1 agree even for p = 2. In both domains, we use these
values to recover s0. The generalization to all inputs a arising in the algorithms is straightforward.
3.2.3 Domains of prime order
The ideas behind the algorithm presented above make use of the fact that the domain’s order can be
factored as a product of small primes (especially for powers of 2, as been shown for {0, 1}n in [26] and
for Z2n in [33]). A case of interest, from the theoretical and practical sides, is domains of (large) prime
order. Notice that each additive group ZN can be decomposed into a direct product of prime subgroups
Zp1 × · · · × Zpn . The query access allows us to work over each subgroup separately, to recover the
coefficients prime-by-prime, similar to the bit-by-bit approach in the GL case above (Section 3.1.1).
Indeed one can query on xj = (0, . . . , 0, xj , 0, . . . , 0) to work over the group Zpj .
4 Thus being able to
find heavy coefficients for functions over a prime group Zp will allow us to find heavy coefficients for
functions over any ZN .
For prime groups the analysis we presented for the algorithm above does not apply as Zp does not
have any proper subgroups, specifically not those of small index. The importance of the subgroups is in
the evaluation of exponential sums (such as equation (2) above), which subsequently allows us to have
useful formulas for the filter functions (such as equation (4)). We now show that one can still follow the
steps in the algorithm above. Natural candidates for the partitioning sets are intervals (of similar size)
of consecutive numbers or classes of numbers with the same remainder modulo 2l (where l represents
4Since deterministic queries are not desirable, additional randomization is used in practice.
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the stage we work at), which is similar to the approach taken over Z2n (see Section 3.2.2).
5 In fact,
using the frequency-shifting and scaling properties of the Fourier transform, one can show that these
two partitions are equivalent (where there is a correspondence between the size of the intervals and the
size of the classes), in the sense that one can transform the coefficients in an interval to coefficients of
the same class modulo 2l and vice versa. We show this equivalence below.
The algorithm over Zp [3] works in the same steps as explained in Section 3.2. The main obstacle
is to show how to efficiently calculate the function fA, for some appropriate set A. We therefore focus
on this step. The other steps are similar to the algorithm for domains of size 2n.
Working in the ‘frequency domain’. In order to show the difficulty working in a domain of prime
size, we start with a naive imitation of the approach taken in the algorithm for domains of size 2n. LetA
be an arithmetic progression in Zp, and define fA =
∑
α∈A f̂(α)χα(x) and hA(x) =
∑
α∈A χα(x) as
above. Then fA(x) = f ∗ hA(x) = Ey∈G
[
f(x− y)hA(y)
]
= Ey∈G
[
f(x− y)∑α∈A χα(y)]. Since
A is an arithmetic progression,
∑
α∈A χα(x) is a geometric progression for which we have a formula.
We get that fA(x) is an expectation over values each of which we can calculate exactly. Moreover,
unlike in the algorithm above, the filter function here is nonzero over a very large set, and therefore
one can hope that specific queries are not needed in this case (as shown in Section 3.2.2 the previous
filter functions are zero almost everywhere, so in order to get a good approximation of fA(x) we need
the specific inputs where the filter function is not zero). This turns out to be a disadvantage. Indeed,
in order to determine fA(x) in polynomial time, we can only approximate this expectation, but as the
values of this geometric progression can be as large as |A|, one derives from the Chernoff bound that the
number of samples needed to have a good approximation of fA(x) is roughly |A|, which is exponential
in log(p) in the first stages of the algorithm. Hence this approach is not practical.
Working in the ‘time domain’. Instead of working in the ‘frequency domain’, we can work in the
‘time domain’. In this case we define A to be a class of numbers with the same remainder mod 2l.
We adapt the filter function in (8) to the Zp case. As in Section 3.2.2, let H be the set containing all
multiples of 2l in Zp. Define H
⊥ := {0, 2−l, 2 · 2−l, . . . , (2l − 1)2−l}. Notice that while H⊥ is not
orthogonal to H , it contains all numbers that give small remainder (mod p) when multiplied by 2l. Let
z ∈ Zp such that z ≡ r (mod 2l) and define A = Ar = {x ∈ Zp | x ≡ r (mod 2l)} to be the class in
Zp for which the remainder mod 2
l is r. We define
hA(x) = hz+H(x) =
 p2lχz(x), if x ∈ H⊥,0, otherwise.
It turns out that this function, which is a simple adaptation of (8) to Zp, is a ‘noisy’ version of a ‘pure’
filter function: the size of the coefficients |ĥA(α)| is close to 1 for α ∈ A and close to 0 for α /∈ A.
5Note that both are arithmetic progressions, which allow evaluating hA.
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Indeed,
ĥA(α) =
1
p
∑
x∈Zp
hA(x)χα(x) =
1
2l
∑
x∈H⊥
χz−α(x) .
Write α = 2lk + j, z = 2lq + r and x = d2−l for 0 ≤ j, r < 2l and 0 ≤ d ≤ ⌊ p
2l
⌋. Then,
ĥA(α) =
1
2l
∑
0≤d≤⌊ p
2l
⌋
χ2lq+r−2lk−j(d2
−l) =
1
2l
∑
0≤d≤⌊ p
2l
⌋
χq−k(d)χr−j(2
−ld) .
One can show that the last sum is large if and only if j = r as χr−j ≡ 1, that is if and only if α ∈ A, and
so that |ĥA(α)| ≈ 1, and otherwise it is close to 0. More precisely, for α = z we have |ĥA(α)| = 1 and
as k gets further away from q, the size of ĥA(2
lk + r) slowly decays (follows from Claim 11 below).
The function hA is said to be “centered around” z. The results in Section 4 below give further insights
for the reasons why this adaptation of the filter function from Z2n to Zp in the time domain, only slightly
affects its frequency domain.
The work of AGS. The approach taken in [3, 1] is to work over intervals. We show how, using the
scaling and frequency-shifting properties, one can transform from the set A to an interval I of the same
size. Define hI(x) := hA(2
−lx), then ĥI(α) = ĥA(2
lα). This is a permutation of the coefficients of
hA. If A = {r, 2l+ r, . . . , t2l+ r}, then I = {r2−l, r2−l+1, . . . , r2−l+ t}, and the coefficients which
were large on A and small outside A are now large over I and small outside it. Moreover, if we define
hI(x) := hA(2
−lx)χc(x) then by the shifting property the previous interval I shifts to I − c.
AGS consider an interval [a, b] of size ⌊ p
2l
⌋, for which c = ⌊a+b2 ⌋ is a middle point. They then
define
ha,b(x) =
 p2lχc(x), if 0 ≤ x < 2l,0, otherwise.
A direct calculation using the definition of ĥa,b(α) shows that
ĥa,b(α) = E
0≤x<2l
[
χc(x)χα(x)
]
= E
0≤x<2l
[
χc−α(x)
]
.
Again, one can show that |ĥa,b(α)| ≈ 1 if a ≤ α ≤ b and |ĥa,b(α)| ≈ 0 for α outside this interval (see,
for example, Claim 11). For further details see [3, 1]. This function is “centered around” c, that is, for
α = c we have |ĥA(α)| = 1 and while α gets further away from c, the size of ĥA(α) slowly decays.
Remark 10. There is a technical issue which we ignore in this description. As the size of ĥA(α) slowly
decays while α moves away from c, when α reaches the end of the interval [a, b] the value |ĥA(α)| is
close to the value |ĥA(β)| for β just outside this interval. This imposes some complexities in the filtering
process; specifically one should take overlapping intervals, so the sets A,B are not distinct as in the
case of domains of size 2n. Moreover, the choice of the point c (therefore the choice of the interval) also
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affects the filtering process. We refer to Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 in [3] and to [1, Section 3] for the
technical details.
With this filter function (either hA or ha,b) fA can be approximated efficiently, as shown in the
previous section. The algorithm now proceeds as the algorithm for domains of size 2n.
3.3 Working with unreliable oracles
It is sometimes desirable to describe access to the function f as querying an oracle. The oracle can be
perfect – always provides the correct value f(x) – or imperfect. Working with unreliable oracles is of
importance in several applications. This section is dedicated to analyzing these cases.
Sometimes the samples f(xi) are given by an unreliable oracle O. By this we mean the oracle
satisfies O(x) = f(x) only with high probability. One can think of O as a ‘noisy version’ of f . A
common approach to this situation is to generate several independent values, each of which gives the
value f(x)with good probability; then, by applying majority rule, one can obtain the correct value f(x)
with overwhelming probability. Examples of this approach are presented in Section 3.1.
We show how the language of Fourier analysis gives a very general approach to analyze situations
for working with unreliable oracles. The main idea is that if a function f has a significant Fourier coef-
ficient, then its noisy version also has a significant coefficient. Note however that if f is concentrated,
then its ‘noisy’ version is not necessarily concentrated.
To be precise, let f : G → C. We describe the oracle as a function O : G → C such that
O(x) = f(x) on the majority of x ∈ G. We assume that ‖O‖∞ ≤ ‖f‖∞. Define R : G → C by
R(x) = O(x) − f(x) and let I = {x ∈ G : R(x) 6= 0}. We want to show that if f̂(α) is τ -heavy,
then Ô(α) is τ ′-heavy, for some τ ′ relatively large (its precise size depends on the success rate of the
oracle).
Since O = f +R, then Ô(α) = f̂(α) + R̂(α). Note that ‖R‖∞ ≤ 2‖f‖∞. Hence∣∣∣Ô(α)∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣f̂(α)∣∣∣ −
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
∑
x∈I
R(x)χα(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣f̂(α)∣∣∣ − 2|I||G| ‖f‖∞ .
As I is small, if f̂(α) is significant then so is Ô(α). Note that as the reliability rate of the oracle
decreases, so does the size of Ô(α), while other coefficients increase in size. One can see that, similarly
to majority rule, more samples are needed when the reliability rate of the oracle decreases. Indeed, the
number of samples is proportional to τ−1 and as the size of the threshold τ decreases, τ−1 increases.
It is well-known that the GL theorem finds the unique function in case of low noise rate, namely
if the the noise rate is smaller than 14 − ǫ. One immediately sees this from our analysis: the original
function satisfies |f̂(s)| = 1, for the secret vector s, and so only one Fourier coefficient of O is larger
than 12 .
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3.4 Hardness of finding significant coefficients in the random access model
The SFT algorithm requires chosen queries. The aim of this section is to explain that one does not
expect a general learning algorithm for problems where the function values cannot be chosen. Indeed,
we will show that if such a learning algorithm existed then the learning parity with noise (LPN) and
learning with errors (LWE) problems would be easy.
Recall the LPN problem: an instance is a list of samples (a, b = 〈a, s〉+ e(a)) ∈ Zn2 ×Z2 for some
secret value s and a function e : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} which determines the noise. Define LPN : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} by LPN(a) := (−1)b. This is a ‘noisy version’ of the function f(x) := (−1)〈a,s〉 for which f̂(s)
is the only non-zero Fourier coefficient. For a small noise rate (as in LPN), as shown in Section 3.3,
the coefficient L̂PN(s) is a significant coefficient for this function. Hence, if one could find significant
coefficients in {0, 1}n on random samples, then one could solve LPN given the samples (a, b). Since
LPN is believed to be hard, one does not expect such a variant of the SFT algorithm to exist. Further
evidence for the hardness of this problem in the random access model is that it is related to the problem
of decoding a random binary linear code.
The same argument holds for LWE in Znp . In LWE one has samples a ∈ Znp and b = 〈a, s〉 + e(a)
(mod p) where e(a) is “small” relative to p. Defining LWE(a) := ωbp one can show that the coefficient
of the character χs(x) = ω
〈x,s〉
p is significant. Hence, if one could find the significant coefficients
when given random samples, then one could solve LWE given the samples (a, b). Since we have good
evidence that LWE is a hard problem, this shows that we do not expect to be able to learn significant
Fourier coefficients in the random access model.
The modulus-dimension tradeoff for LWE [29] shows how to transform LWE in Znp to LWE in Z
n/d
pd
(albeit with a different error distribution), and so one can conclude that finding significant coefficients
in Zpn on random samples is at least as hard as solving LWE in Z
n
p with binary secrets. This is an
example of the connection between Zn2 and Z2n as explained in Remark 9.
4. SIMPLIFICATIONS: MODULUS SWITCHING
The SFT algorithm is considerably simpler to understand and implement for Zn2 or Z2n than for Zp.
Furthermore, for domains of size 2n, considerable effort has been invested by researchers in the engi-
neering community into making this algorithm more efficient with respect to various measures [17] (see
also Mansour and Sahar [35]). Hence, it is natural to try to work with functions over Z2n instead of
functions over Zp. We now sketch an approach that shows how one can transform functions on Zp into
functions on Z2n where 2
n ≈ p, while maintaining a relation between their significant coefficients. In
analogy to similar ideas in lattice cryptography we call this “modulus switching”.
These ideas are implicit in the work of Shor [42] on factoring with quantum computers. Shor
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extends a periodic function to a larger domain. The core idea is that if a function is periodic, then the
period, which is a feature of the time domain, is preserved over any (large enough) domain. This fact is
exploited by Shor, where his further ideas take place in the frequency domain. Shor’s analysis provides a
clear interaction between the representation of a (periodic) function in the time and frequency domains.
We extend these ideas to show that a much larger class of functions keeps the properties of their fre-
quency domain representation, when extending their time domain. Specifically, significant coefficients
are “preserved” even when the time domain representation of the function is extended (by “preserved”
we mean that there is a clear relation between the significant coefficients of both functions). We refer
to Laity and Shani [28] for the technical details.
LetN = 2n > p be the smallest power of two greater than p. For a function f : Zp → C, we define
f˜(x) :=
{
f(x) when 0 ≤ x < p,
0 when p ≤ x < N.
Note that the operation f 7→ f˜ is C-linear. The basic observation (see Figure 1) is that for a character
χα on Zp, χ˜α(x) is a function on ZN that is also concentrated.
∣∣∣̂˜χα(z)∣∣∣2
z ∈ ZN
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Figure 1: The magnitude of the Fourier coefficients ̂˜χα(z). Here p = 37, N = 64 and α = 5.
To explain this observation we state the following basic fact and sketch a proof of it. It is straight-
forward to turn this result into a rigorous upper bound.
Claim 11. Let N > 1, ωN = e
2pii
N and let α ∈ R, α 6= 0, |α| < N/2 and K ∈ N. Define
Sα,K =
K−1∑
x=0
ωαxN .
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Then
|Sα,K | ≈ N |1− ω
αK
N |
2π|α| .
To see this note that the geometric series sums to (1 − ωαKN )/(1 − ωαN ) and the denominator is
(1 − cos(2πα/N)) − i sin(2πα/N) which has norm squared equal to 2(1 − cos(2πα/N)). Finally,
since (1− cos(x)) ≈ x2/2 (indeed x22 (1− x
2
12 ) ≤ 1− cos(x) ≤ x
2
2 ), the result follows.
We now compute the Fourier transform of χ˜α as a function on ZN where N = 2
n. We have
̂˜χα(β) = 〈χ˜α, χβ〉 = 1N
p−1∑
x=0
exp
(
2πi
(
α
p − βN
)
x
)
.
If αp − βN 6= 0, which will be satisfied in general since α, β ∈ Z while gcd(p,N) = 1, then applying
Claim 11 gives the approximation∣∣∣̂˜χα(β)∣∣∣ ≈ |1− exp(2πi(α/p − β/N))|2π|α/p − β/N | .
If β ≈ Nα/p then this coefficient is large and so the function χ˜α has a significant Fourier coefficient at
⌊Nα/p⌉. Moreover, the size of ̂˜χα(⌊Nα/p + k⌉), for 0 < |k| < N/2, is bounded by O(1/k), and so
χ˜α is concentrated in a small set Γ ⊆ ZN of characters represented by values around Nα/p.
Since the maps f 7→ f˜ and g 7→ ĝ are C-linear, for any f(x) =∑α∈G f̂(α)χα(x) we have
̂˜
f (β) =
p−1∑
α=0
f̂(α)̂˜χα(β) .
Thus, if f̂(α) is a significant coefficient for f , then one expects that for β = ⌊Nα/p⌉, the coefficient̂˜
f (β) is significant for f˜ . The work of Laity and Shani [28] made these arguments to a precise theorem.
Theorem 12 ([28, Theorem 1.1]). Let {nk}k∈N, {mk}k∈N two sequences of positive integers withmk ≥
nk/2 for every k ∈ N. Let Q ∈ R[x] be a polynomial. Let {fk : Znk → C}k∈N be a concentrated
family of functions such that ‖fk‖22 ≤ Q(log(nk)) for all k ∈ N. Then {f˜k : Zmk → C}k∈N is a
concentrated family of functions.
Specifically, if f(x) is a concentrated function on Zp then f˜(x) is a concentrated function on Z2n .
A similar result holds where f is ǫ-concentrated. We refer to [28] for the technical details.
As a consequence, one sees that it is not necessary to develop a variant of the SFT algorithm for the
group Zp. Instead one can simply modulus-switch to a power of two and apply the SFT algorithm for
the group Z2n . This is addressed in [28, Section 6.1]. Since the algorithms for Z2n have been optimised
significantly (see [17, 35]) we believe that the resulting algorithms will be no less efficient than applying
the AGS algorithm directly. Moreover, unlike the complexities working directly over Zp as explained
in Remark 10, this technique (although it might introduce new “noise”) overcomes the need to take
overlapping intervals and is not subject to the choice of the interval.
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4.1 The i-bit function is concentrated
We now explain that modulus switching provides an alternative proof of the Morillo–Ra`fols result that
every single-bit functions is concentrated [38].
The above discussion assumed the function f˜ extends f from Zp to Z2n where 2
n is slightly larger
than p. As Theorem 12 shows, one can consider modulus switching for domains of any size, including
switching to a smaller domain. The results about concentration hold in this greater generality, and this
provides a new technique to prove concentration of (some) families of functions, by showing that a
subfamily of functions, defined on domains of specific forms, is concentrated.
Theorem 13 ([28, Theorem 6.1]). Consider a family of functions J = {f2k : Z2k → C}k∈N and
define the family J ′ = {fn : Zn → C}n∈N, where for each 2k−1 < n ≤ 2k we let fn(x) := f2k(x)
for every x ∈ Zn. If J is concentrated then J ′ is concentrated.
As an application, one can prove that the i-th bit function is concentrated by showing that the family
of the i-th bit function on domains Z2k is concentrated, that is, that {biti : Z2k → {−1, 1}}i<k∈N is
concentrated. Here i can be a function of k, so for example the most-significant-bit function is given by
i = k − 1. The latter can be easily proven using the structure of these functions under these domains.
This is summarized in the following lemma, where we define |x|N := min{x,N − x}.
Lemma 14 ([28, Lemma 6.2]). Let k ∈ N and 0 ≤ i < k. Define biti : Z2k → {−1, 1} by biti(x) =
(−1)xi where x = ∑k−1j=0 xj2j and xj ∈ {0, 1}. Let α ∈ Z2k . Then b̂iti(α) = 0 unless α is an odd
multiple of 2k−i−1 in which case |b̂iti(α)| = O(2k−i/|α|2k ).
The lemma shows that, when i is small there are a few non-zero coefficients (especially for i = 0,
there is only one non-zero coefficient at α = 2k−1). When i is “medium” then there are non-zero
coefficients at all multiples α = j2k−i−1, j odd, and they decrease in size with 1/|j|2k . When i is large
(e.g., i = k − 1) then the significant coefficients are all close to 0 and are spaced at distance 2 · 2k−1−i
(i.e., when i = k− 1 they are 2 apart; for the second most significant bit they are spaced 4 apart, and so
on).
A corollary is that the i-th bit function on Z2k is concentrated. See arguments on the function
half in Example 5 and [3, Claim 4.1]. For clarification, we state again that i can be a fixed constant
(i = 0 corresponds to the least significant bit) or be dependent on k (i = k − 1 corresponds to the most
significant bit).
Having established that the i-th bit function is concentrated on Z2k , our modulus switching approach
shows that the i-th bit function (on any domains ZN ) is concentrated by Theorem 13. This general
approach gives a new and simpler proof of the result in [38] (the proof in [38] is very technical; they
decompose N = k2i ±m and consider different cases ofm).
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5. APPLICATIONS: CRYPTOGRAPHY
The SFT algorithm has been used to reprove known results on the hardness of recovering bits of the
secret values in the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and RSA problem. It has been used to give
reductions for the learning with errors (LWE) [41] and learning with rounding (LWR) [6] problems, that
prove that the ‘search’ and ‘decision’ problems are equivalently hard even when the number of samples
is fixed. It has also been used to prove results about the hardness of recovering bits of Diffie–Hellman
shared secrets keys in both (non-prime) finite fields and elliptic curves. This section surveys how the
SFT algorithm is used in these applications. In addition, we explain the specific model for which the
Diffie–Hellman results hold, and clarify that the question whether single bits of Diffie–Hellman shared
keys are hardcore (in the usual model) is still open.
5.1 Background and motivation
A one-way function h, if it exists, assures that while given x it is easy to compute h(x), retrieving
x from h(x) is hard. This hardness does not necessarily mean that given h(x) one cannot find some
partial information of x. Naturally, the main interest is in trying to learn some bits of x, but other sorts
of partial information have also been considered. Bits of x that cannot be learnt from h(x), or more
generally cannot be predicted noticeably better than a guess, are called hardcore bits. In other words, a
hardcore bit is a bit which is as hard to compute (or to predict) as the entire secret value. For a historical
overview see [20]. To show that a bit (or a set of bits) is hardcore, one usually tries to construct an
algorithm that inverts h, given a target value h(x) and an oracle that takes h(t) and outputs a bit of t.
In order to do so, one first needs to establish a way to query the oracle on values h(t) such that there is
some known relation between t and x, for example t = αx for known α’s.
A useful language to describe these ideas is the hidden number problem, which was introduced by
Boneh and Venkatesan [11] in order to study bit security of secrets keys arising from Diffie–Hellman
key exchange. This problem turned out to be general enough to be applied to other cryptographic
problems like DLP and RSA. In fact, the generality of the problem allows it to be used also outside of
the scope of bit security (see [40, Section 4.4] and references within, also [13, 5]). Therefore, the hidden
number problem is of theoretical interest and is studied today in its own right. It has many extensions
and different variants; see [44] for a comprehensive survey.
Definition 15 (Hidden number problem). Let (G, ·) be a group, let s 6= 0 be a secret (unknown) element
ofG and let f be a function defined overG. Find s using oracle access to the function fs(x) := f(s ·x).
We use the term oracle access as a general term for either of the following oracle models: in the
random access model the solver receives polynomial many samples (x, fs(x)) where the values x are
drawn independently and uniformly at random from G; in the query access model the solver can query
26
the oracle on any input x ⊆ G and receive the answer (x, fs(x)). To emphasize the difference between
these models, we refer to the hidden number problem in the latter model as chosen-multiplier hidden
number problem (CM-HNP). This problem can also be divided into twomodels, namely adaptive access
where the solver has a continuous access to the oracle and can query it at any time of the recovery
process, and non-adaptive access where the solver is not allowed to query the oracle once the recovery
process has started. Other types of access models could be also considered. For example, the original
work on the hidden number problem [11] considers an oracle for which on the query x ∈ Zp replies
with (x, f(sgx)).
An interesting case is when the oracle is unreliable. That is, the oracle does not give a correct
answer all the time, but with some probability. It is common to call an oracle that always provides a
correct answer a perfect oracle. An oracle that is correct only with some noticeable advantage is called
an unreliable or imperfect oracle.
The following table summarizes some of the known results on the hidden number problem in dif-
ferent models. Here p is a prime number and ‘imperfect’ under the ‘Oracle’ column refers to an oracle
with any non-negligible advantage over trivial guessing. The starting point of this work is the Boneh–
Venkatesan result [11] which requires a perfect oracle and uses lattice methods rather than Fourier
learning methods; this work was adapted to unreliable oracles by [21], but there is a complex tradeoff
with the number of bits and so we do not include it in our table.
Problem Access Group Bits Oracle Remarks
HNP random Z∗p
√
log p+ log log pMSB6 perfect Given by [11]
CM-HNP adaptive Z∗p LSB imperfect Given by [4]
CM-HNP adaptive Z∗p any single bit imperfect Given by [24]
CM-HNP non-adaptive Z∗N MSB & LSB imperfect Given by [8]
CM-HNP non-adaptive Z∗N each single bit for the outer
log log p bits
imperfect Given by [3]
CM-HNP non-adaptive Z∗N any single bit imperfect Given by [38]
Most early works such as [4, 8, 24] require complicated algebraic manipulations such as tweaking
and untweaking bits. Using the SFT algorithm [3] gives a uniform and clear approach. We present this
solution to CM-HNP, using different terminology than the original one, for functions of norm 1, as the
subsequent applications involve single bit functions (with the convention that biti(x) = (−1)xi where
xi is the i-th bit of x).
Theorem 16 ([3]). Let f : ZN → {−1, 1} be a function with a τ -heavy Fourier coefficient α ∈ Z∗N for
6Since one can easily transform HNP with the LSB function to HNP with the MSB function, HNP can also be solved given√
log p + log log p LSB. A generalization of this technique [39, Section 5.1] allows to transform HNP with 2d consecutive
inner bits to HNP with dMSB, hence HNP can also be solved given 2(
√
log p+ log log p) consecutive inner bits.
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τ−1 = poly(log |G|). Then, the chosen-multiplier hidden number problem in ZN with s ∈ Z∗N and the
function f can be solved in polynomial time.
In particular, the theorem holds for every concentrated function.
Remark 17 (Coding Theory terminology). Theorem 16 rephrases Theorem 2 of [3]. The latter work
gives a polynomial time list-decoding algorithm for concentrated codes with corrupted code words
(Theorem 1) and subsequently a general list-decoding methodology for proving hardcore functions
(Theorem 2). Most subsequent works on hardcore bits adopt this coding-theoretic language. Thus, in
order to apply Theorem 2 of [3], these works use Theorem 1 of [3], which applies to concentrated codes.
This caused the authors of these works to put effort into proving that a particular code is concentrated.
However, we emphasize that to apply the CM-HNP approach of [3] there is no need for the function
to be concentrated. Instead it suffices that the function has a significant Fourier coefficient, and this is
usually much easier to prove. We make this clear in our formulation of Theorem 16. In other words,
while concentration is sufficient for a code to be recoverable it is not a necessary condition. For these
reasons (and others) we find the coding-theoretic language unhelpful and do not use it in this paper.
We now sketch the proof of Theorem 16: run the SFT algorithm on f and fs to get short lists
L,Ls of τ -heavy coefficients for each function, respectively. By the scaling property f̂s(α) = f̂(αs
−1)
for every α. Therefore, for every α ∈ Ls for which f̂s(α) is τ -heavy there exists β ∈ L such that
β = αs−1. The secret s can be recovered efficiently. Notice that while the hidden number problem
takes place in a multiplicative group, this solution involves Fourier analysis over an additive group.
A template for algorithms for CM-HNP is the following: show that (i) the “partial information”
function f has a significant coefficient, (ii) the function fs has a significant coefficient, and (iii) some
(recoverable) relation between the coefficients of f and fs exists. If one succeeds in showing these
conditions, then using the SFT algorithm one can solve this instance of CM-HNP. This template allows
bit security researchers to look for settings where a solution to CM-HNP is already known (namely,
cases where these three conditions are already known to hold, like single-bit functions over ZN ) and try
to convert their problem of interest to this setting.
5.1.1 The multivariate hidden number problem
Another case of interest is the multivariate hidden number problem (MVHNP), which we define as
follows.
Definition 18 (Multivariate hidden number problem). LetR be a ring, let s = (s1, . . . , sm) 6= (0, . . . , 0)
be a secret (unknown) element in Rm and let f be a function defined over R. Find s using oracle access
to the function fs(x) := f(s · x) = f(s1x1 + · · ·+ smxm).
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Specific instances of this problem are LWE and LWR, and it is related to trace-HNP [31] and
polynomial HNP [43]. Similar to the solution to HNP in Zp, one can give a solution in Zpm in the
random access model for a function f that outputs
√
log(pm) =
√
m log(p)MSB’s of its input (derived
from [43], for example).
One can also define CM-MVHNP, the chosen-multiplier version of the multivariate hidden number
problem, similar to CM-HNP. To solve this variant we need an analogue of the Fourier scaling property
in higher dimensions. Such an analogue, which we call the multivariate scaling property, is given in [16,
Lemma 13] and we sketch it now.
Multivariate scaling property. Let f : Zp → C, let s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Zmp such that not all si = 0, and
define fs : Z
m
p → C by fs(x) := f(s · x). For any sk 6= 0, the Fourier transform of fs satisfies
f̂s (z) = f̂s(z1, . . . , zm) =
{
f̂(c) if (z1, . . . , zm) = (cs1, . . . , csm), c ∈ Zp ;
0 otherwise.
This allows generalizing Theorem 16 to CM-MVHNP. The proof, which we omit, follows from the
proof to Theorem 16 given above.
Theorem 19 ([16]). Let f : Zp → {−1, 1} be a function with a τ -heavy Fourier coefficient α ∈ Z∗p for
τ−1 = poly(log |G|). Then, the chosen-multiplier multivariate hidden number problem in Zmp with the
function f can be solved in polynomial time.
5.2 Applications
We present some of the applications in cryptography of the SFT algorithm. They are all based on
reducing some problems to the CM-HNP or CM-MVHNP. In the following we assume to have an
oracle O that solves some problem, and show how to use this oracle to solve a harder problem, thus
establishing the hardness equivalence between the two problems.
5.2.1 Proving known results: bit security of RSA and DLP
The first application of the algorithm was given in [3], where it is shown that the most significant
bit and least significant bit are hardcore for the RSA function RSAN,e(x) := x
e (mod N) and for
exponentiation EXPg(x) := g
x, where g is an element of prime order ℓ in some group. The results
hold for imperfect oracles that have noticeable advantage over guessing. These results were already
known, as [4] first shows that the LSB is hardcore for the RSA function and [24] shows that every bit is
hardcore for both functions. Nevertheless, the approach based on SFT is more general (holds for every
function with significant coefficients) and simpler. We explain how to derive these results.
Claim 20. Each single bit is hardcore for the RSA function. That is, predicting any bit of x, given
RSAN,e(x), is as hard as inverting the RSA function.
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We sketch the proof: One direction is trivial. In the other direction, given an instance RSAN,e(x) =
xe (mod N), we want to recover x. Suppose the (imperfect) oracle O takes RSAN,e(t) := t
e
(mod N) and outputs biti(t), the i-th bit of t. Since the values e,N are public in the RSA setting, for
every number r one can compute RSAN,e(rx (mod N)) by (r
e (mod N))(xe (mod N)) = (rx)e
(mod N). Hence, given RSAN,e(x) one can query the oracle on RSAN,e(rx) to get the i-th bit of rx
for every chosen r. The problem therefore becomes the CM-HNP in Z∗N , and this can be solved using
the SFT algorithm over the additive group (ZN ,+), which has known order. Indeed, biti is concen-
trated (see Section 4.1), thus has a significant coefficient. The oracle function O also has a significant
coefficient (see Section 3.3). The rest follows from Theorem 16.
Claim 21. Each single bit is hardcore for the exponentiation function EXPg for prime-order element
g. That is, predicting any bit of x, given EXPg(x) is as hard as inverting the function EXPg , i.e.
solving DLP in the corresponding group.
The proof, which we leave as an exercise, is similar to the previous case, using the fact that (gx)r =
grx. This proves bit security results for the DLP in finite fields and elliptic curves. Similar results also
hold for other functions (problems), as Rabin (see [1, Chapter 7]) and the Paillier trapdoor permutation
(see [38, Section 7]).
5.2.2 Bit security of the Diffie–Hellman protocol and related schemes
An open question is to prove that single bits of Diffie–Hellman keys are hardcore. Here we consider an
oracle O that on g, ga, gb returns a single bit of the Diffie–Hellman key s = gab. To interact with the
oracle, notice that given gb one can compute gb+r = gbgr for any r. One can then query the oracle O
with g, ga, gb+r and receive a bit of ga(b+r) = gabgar = st. This is how the hidden number problem
was originally identified. This interaction does not correspond to the CM-HNP, since choosing the
multiplier t = (ga)r (for the secret s) is equivalent to finding discrete logarithms for the base ga in Z∗p.
Advice bits. For related schemes where the exponent a is fixed (unlike schemes using ephemeral expo-
nents, as in Diffie-Hellman key exchange), Akavia [2] followed Boneh–Venkatesen [12] to get around
this problem by assuming an “advice” that provides the discrete logarithms of the chosen multipliers t
to the base ga, but this is not realistic in actual applications (see also our remark in Section 6.2). There
is currently no method known to prove the hardness of single bits of Diffie–Hellman keys in the usual
model.
New Diffie–Hellman model. To overcome this problem, Boneh and Shparlinski [10] suggested (in the
context of elliptic curves) a different model where the oracle O takes as input, in addition to the values
g, ga, gb, a group homomorphism φ : G → G′, and then outputs partial information (e.g. a single bit)
of φ(gab). The approach is then to keep the inputs g, ga, gb fixed and to use φ as the way to choose
30
multipliers for s = gab in the hidden number problem. This model corresponds to a variant of Diffie–
Hellman key exchange, where a representation of the group is not fixed. We call this the representation
changing model.
This is an example of our discussion at the end of Section 5.1 above on converting a given problem
to a setting (a new model, in this case) that allows to apply the solution to CM-HNP. We now explain
how in this model one can reduce the original problem to variants of CM-HNP.
In this model one can think of the bit security problem for any secret element s (not necessarily a
Diffie–Hellman key as the interaction with the oracle does not come from the key exchange setting).
Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ G and write φ(s) = (φ1(s), . . . , φn(s)) ∈ G′, and suppose that the oracle O
returns a bit of some component φi(s). Write also r = (r1, . . . , rn). Suppose there exists a family
of homomorphisms φr for every7 r such that for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n the i-th component of φr satisfies
φri(x) :=
∑n
j=1 rjxj . Then, getting a single bit of φ
r
i(s) =
∑n
j=1 rjsj for chosen r, gives rise to CM-
MVHNP for a single-bit function and the secret s. A special case is where r is of the form rj · ej =
(0, . . . , 0, rj , 0, . . . , 0). Then φ
r
i(s) = rjsj , which gives rise to CM-HNP for a single-bit function and
secret sj .
Therefore, if one can find a group for which the condition on the homomorphisms φr holds, then
proving the hardness of single bits in this model reduces to either CM-MVHNP or CM-HNP (note that
in the latter case one only recovers a component of s, and therefore needs other methods for recovering
the entire value s; for the case in which s = gab is a Diffie–Hellman key in Fpm that we describe below,
one can use the results involving “summing functions” from [48] and recover the entire secret s from
the algorithm that recovers a single (fixed) component si; for the case of elliptic curves it is sufficient to
know one coordinate, as there are at most 3 values for the other coordinate). We give a brief overview
of the known results in the literature.
As mentioned above, this idea was introduced by Boneh and Shparlinski [10] for the LSB of (both
the x, y coordinates of) Diffie–Hellman keys in elliptic curve groups over prime fields. It is shown
there that changing the Weierstrass equation is an isomorphism that gives rise to the desired multipliers.
Indeed, it is well known that twists of the curve give φ(x, y) = (u2x, u3y). Therefore, given a request
for desired multiplier r (for example by the SFT algorithm), one can obtain it if there is a solution to
ud = r (where d = 2 or d = 3, depends on the coordinate) and flip a coin to guess the bit if a solution
does not exist. The work [10] uses the same technique as in [4] to prove hardness of LSB. This approach
was then applied by [14] (see also [25]) to every single bit of a larger class of elliptic curve secrets, that
also includes Diffie–Hellman keys in elliptic curves, using the SFT algorithm (that is, using the solution
to CM-HNP for single-bit functions, as in Theorem 16).
The idea of changing group representations can also be used for finite fields. The works [15, 49]
7It is sufficient that there is a ‘large enough’ subfamily of homomorphisms.
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consider the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem in groups F∗pm form > 1. They show that
some polynomial representations of Fpm give rise to the desired homomorphisms φ
r for r = rj · ej , and
therefore reduce to CM-HNP.
For a detailed overview of these techniques we refer the reader to the exposition of Sections
5, 5.1, 5.2 and subsections within of [16]. This latter work gives applications of the solution for CM-
MVHNP to show bit security of the computational Diffie–Hellman problem in groups of higher dimen-
sion in models similar to those mentioned above; specifically, for elliptic curves over extension fields,
and for F∗pm with different (non-polynomial) representations of the field Fpm.
We stress that these models do not tell a lot about the hardness of specific bits in real-life imple-
mentations of Diffie–Hellman key exchange, where the representation of the group is fixed. One should
interpret results in the representation changing model as follows: assuming hardness of CDH in a group
G (where G can be the multiplicative group of a finite extension field or an elliptic curve over a finite
field), there is no algorithm that takes g, ga, gb ∈ G and outputs the i-th bit of gab for many representa-
tions of G (more precisely, for representations corresponding to the specific isomorphisms used in the
reduction). Nevertheless, given an instance ga, gb in a specific representation of G, this result does not
tell us whether it is hard to compute a specific bit of the secret gab. Indeed, this problem is still open.
5.2.3 Sample-preserving search-to-decision reductions for LWE and LWR
We assume the reader is familiar with the search and decision variants of the LWE and LWR prob-
lems [6, 41]. The problem at hand is to reduce the search problem to the decision problem. That is,
to show that the decision problem is at least as hard as the search problem. This is done in a similar
fashion to the bit security reductions above: one assumes an oracle to the decision problem is available,
and uses it to solve the search problem. We explain the reduction and show how the SFT algorithm is
used to get a reduction in the stronger “sample preserving” model. This is done, as above, by reducing
the problem to CM-MVHNP.
We only focus on the part of the reduction which involves the SFT algorithm; the entire reduction
is more involved. By a “hybrid” argument (see [20, Theorem 1] or [9, Lemma 3]), one can reduce the
decision problem to distinguishing a specific LWE sample, among the set of all samples.8 We therefore
consider a single LWE sample.
The standard method to show that the decision problem is as hard as the search problem is as
follows. Suppose one has a perfect decision oracle. Given an LWE sample b = 〈a, s〉 + e = a1s1 +
. . . + ansn + e (mod p) one makes a guess s
′ for s1 and re-randomises the sample as a
′ = (a1 +
r, a2, . . . , an), b
′ = b+ rs′ (mod p). If the guess is correct (i.e., if s′ = s1) then (a
′, b′) is a valid LWE
sample whereas if the guess is incorrect then b′ is uniform and independent of the other smaples. Hence
8The reduction given in [36] uses the duality of the LWE and knapsack functions.
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the decision oracle determines whether the guess s′ of the secret value s1 is correct. After at most pn
queries to the decision oracle one can compute the secret s.
When the oracle is not perfect one will have to repeat this procedure with different inputs (a, b)
and follow majority rule. When the success rate of the oracle is low, one may not have enough initial
inputs (a, b) to satisfactorily apply the majority rule, and therefore would need to draw more samples.
A sample-preserving reduction is a reduction that uses only the initial given samples, and does not ask
for more samples during the procedure. Micciancio and Mol [36] used the SFT algorithm to give a
sample-preserving search-to-decision reduction for the learning with errors problem. We now explain
this reduction.
The standard method above involves choosing a unit vector ej and guessing 〈ej, s〉. Micciancio and
Mol observe that one can choose any vector v and guess 〈v, s〉, then let the decision oracle to advise
whether this guess is correct or incorrect. Again, if the oracle is perfect then one determines the correct
guesses, denotes them by bv, and eventually obtains n linear equations in s and hence can solve the
problem. However if the oracle is not perfect (but has a noticeable advantage over a random guess),
then in the case where the oracle says that the guess for 〈v, s〉 is incorrect (more precisely, that the
distribution is uniform), one sets bv to be some value from the remaining p − 1 possibilities, chosen
uniformly. Then for a selection of chosen vectors v we have the values bv, for which bv = 〈v, s〉 with
some noticeable bias from 1p . In other words, we have query access to a noisy version of the function
f(v) = 〈v, s〉 (mod p).
This is an instance of CM-MVHNP with an unreliable oracle. The function ωbvp , which is a noisy
version of ω
〈v,s〉
p , has a significant coefficient for the character χs (see Section 6.1). Thus, one can run
the SFT algorithm on the function ωbvp , to find this significant coefficient, hence the character, and thus
solve this problem.
A very similar approach is taken in [9] for the learning with rounding problem. We remark that in
the case of a non-prime p the reduction is more subtle, and requires some restrictions (see [36, 9] for
more details). We also remark that the reduction is an average-case reduction, and does not hold for
the worst case (more precisely, there may be a set of initial samples {(ai, bi)} for which the reduction
fails). A sample-preserving reduction for the latter is still an open problem.
6. LIMITATIONS: NON-LINEAR PROBLEMS
This section presents limitations on natural generalisation of the approaches taken above to a larger class
of applications. We show that the linearity in the hidden number problem, induced from the operation
s · x, is essential for the SFT to be useful. In particular, we give an answer (in the negative) to an open
question in [32].
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The solution to the CM-HNP in ZN (Theorem 16) is based on Fourier analysis in the additive group
(ZN ,+) and it exploits the scaling property of the Fourier transform for the function fs(x) := f(sx).
In other words, the function fs is the composition of f with a linear map on ZN . It is natural to consider
whether this approach can be used for other algebraic groups (such as elliptic curves and algebraic tori).
The hidden number problem in the case of elliptic curves is to determine a secret point S ∈ E(Fp) given
samples (P, f(S+P ))where a typical choice for the function would be f(Q) = biti(x(Q)). The natural
approach is to still use Fourier analysis in the additive group (Zp,+) but instead of composing with a
linear map, to compose with a rational function (e.g., coming from the translation map tS(P ) = P+S).
Another generalisation would be Fourier analysis in other groups (G, ·).
If such tools could be developed we might have an approach to the bit security of Diffie–Hellman
key exchange in the group of elliptic curve points in certain models. There are also other interesting
problems that could be approached with Fourier analysis on general groups. For example, the authors
of [32] raise the question whether it is possible to apply these results to the modular inversion hidden
number problem.
Unfortunately, there is a major obstacle to applying the SFT algorithm to these sorts of problems.
Namely, if f is a concentrated function then the composition f ◦ϕ is concentrated only when ϕ is affine.
In fact, f ◦ϕ has significant coefficients only when ϕ is affine. The aim of this section is to explain this
obstacle. Since the translation map for the elliptic curve group law is a non-affine rational function, this
explains why the method cannot be directly applied to the elliptic curve hidden number problem. Our
argument also answers the question of [32] in the negative.
Let f : G → C be a function and let fs(x) = f ◦ ϕs(x), where ϕs : G → G is an efficiently
computable function (that depends on some unknown value s). To generalise the proof of Theorem 16
one needs the following three conditions:
1. the function f has significant coefficients;
2. the function fs has significant coefficients;
3. there exists a relation between the significant coefficients of f and fs that allows to determine s
(or at least a small set of candidates for s).
One special case is when f is a constant function. Then fs is also a constant function and both
conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. The problem is that a constant function cannot tell us anything about
the secret s, and so condition 3 does not hold. Hence, we need to focus on functions that are far from
constant, which we formalise in our proof by requiring that f̂(0) = 0 (in other words, f is “balanced”).
Having dispensed with this special case we focus on the first two conditions. We first consider the
case when f is concentrated. If ϕs(x) = ax + b is affine then we already know from the scaling and
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time-shifting properties that all Fourier coefficients of f are preserved in fs, and so if f is concentrated
then fs is also concentrated. Our aim is to show a converse to this fact: if ϕs is a rational function and
if conditions 1 and 2 both hold then ϕs must be affine. This result is closely related to the Beurling–
Helson Theorem [7] (see [27, 30] for related results in Zp) and the work of Green and Konyagin [23]
on the Fourier transform of balanced functions.
For our result we need the following lemma [39, Lemma 7] (a proof, for general fields Fpm , can be
found in [37, Theorem 2]).
Lemma 22. Let q be prime. For any polynomials f, g ∈ Fq[x] such that the rational function h = fg is
not constant in Fq, the following bound holds∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
λ∈Fp
∗ωh(λ)q
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (max{deg(f),deg(g)} + u− 2)√q + δ ,
where
∑∗
means that the summation is taken over all λ ∈ Fq which are not poles of h and
(u, δ) =
{
(v, 1) if deg(f) ≤ deg(g),
(v + 1, 0) if deg(f) > deg(g),
and v is the number of distinct zeros of g in the algebraic closure of Fq.
We formulate the following result for functions on Zq for a prime q, but it can be generalised to
finite fields Fpm with m > 1. Let g, h ∈ Zq[x] be polynomials where h is not the constant zero. Let
Zh be the set of zeroes in Zq of h. We define ϕ(x) = g(x)/h(x) for all x ∈ Zq \ Zh and ϕ(x) = 0
otherwise (since we will assume Zh is small compared with q it does not matter how we define ϕ on
Zh).
Recall that the definition of concentration applies to families of functions. To keep the formula-
tion of the following proposition clean, we call a single function concentrated as explained after the
definition above.
Proposition 23. Let q be a sufficiently large prime. Let f be a concentrated function on Zq such that
‖f‖2 = 1 and f̂(0) = 0. Let g, h ∈ Zq[x] be polynomials of degree bounded by poly(log(q)) and
let Zh be the set of zeroes of h. Define ϕ(x) as above and suppose this function is non-constant. Let
τ = 1/poly(log(q)). If f ◦ ϕ has any τ -heavy Fourier coefficients then ϕ(x) = ax + b for some
a, b ∈ Zq.
Proof. Let G = Zq and write f =
∑
α∈G f̂(α)χα. Let d = max{deg(g(x)),deg(h(x))}. Let ǫ =
τ
32d2 . Since f is concentrated there is a set Γ of size poly(log(|G|)) such that
‖f − f |Γ‖22 ≤ ǫ =
τ
32d2
.
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Since f̂(0) = 0 it follows that Γ does not contain zero.
Now consider fϕ(x) = f(ϕ(x)) =
∑
α∈G f̂(α)χα(ϕ(x)). Assume it has a τ -heavy coefficient; for
contradiction we suppose ϕ(x) 6= ax+ b for any a, b. For every β ∈ G we have
f̂ϕ(β) =
1
|G|
∑
x∈G
fϕ(x)χβ(x) =
1
|G|
∑
x∈G
f(ϕ(x))χβ(x) =
1
|G|
∑
x∈G
∑
α∈G
f̂(α)χα(ϕ(x))χβ(x) =
1
|G|
∑
α∈G
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G
χα(ϕ(x))χβ(x) =
1
|G|
∑
α∈G
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G
χ1(αϕ(x) − βx) = 1|G|
∑
α∈G
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G
χ1(ψ
β
α(x)) ,
where we denote ψβα(x) = αϕ(x) − βx. Since f̂(0) = 0 we can ignore the case α = 0 and by our
supposition that ϕ 6= ax+bwe know that there are no α, β such that ψβα is constant. Hence, the last sum
is a character sum satisfying the conditions of Lemma 22. Furthermore, ψβα = (αg(x)−βxh(x))/h(x)
and so the value u in Lemma 22 is bounded by max
{
deg(g),deg(h)
} ≤ d. Applying Lemma 22, we
get that for every α 6= 0 and every β it holds that |∑x∈G\Zh χ(ψβα(x))| ≤ C where C = 2d√q.
Now note that
f̂ϕ(β) =
1
|G|
∑
α∈G
f̂(α)
∑
x∈Zh
χ1(ψ
β
α(x))+
1
|G|
∑
α∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ1(ψ
β
α(x))+
1
|G|
∑
α/∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ1(ψ
β
α(x)) .
For the first term we note that |∑x∈Zh χ1(ψβα(x))| ≤ |Zh| ≤ d and that ‖f‖2 = 1 implies∑α∈G |f̂(α)| ≤√|G| = √q and |f̂(α)| ≤ 1 for all α. Therefore
∣∣∣f̂ϕ(β)∣∣∣ ≤ d√
q
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
∑
α∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβα(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
∑
α/∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβα(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
We apply the triangle inequality on the first sum and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality on the second.
Let k = |Γ| and write Γ = {α1, . . . , αk}. Then using Lemma 22 we get∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
∑
α∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβα(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
k∑
j=1
f̂(αj)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβαj (x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣1q
k∑
j=1
f̂(αj) · C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
q
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣f̂(αj)∣∣∣C = 2kd√
q
.
Since k = |Γ| = poly(log(q)) we have that this bound (similarly for the earlier bound d/√q) is
negligible, so we have for example
d√
q
+
2kd√
q
< 2d
√
ǫ .
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From Parseval’s identity
∑
α/∈Γ
∣∣∣f̂(α)∣∣∣2 = ‖f − f |Γ‖22 ≤ ǫ. Therefore, by the Cauchy–Schwarz
inequality we have∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
∑
α/∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβα(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1|G|
∑
α/∈Γ
∣∣∣f̂(α)∣∣∣2
 12
∑
α/∈Γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβα(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

1
2
≤ 1|G|
√
ǫ
∑
α/∈Γ
C2
 12 .
Then ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|G|
∑
α/∈Γ
f̂(α)
∑
x∈G\Zh
χ(ψβα(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
ǫ
√
q − k2d√q
q
≤ 2d√ǫ .
Finally, combining the bounds we get∣∣∣f̂ϕ(β)∣∣∣2 ≤ ( d√
q
+
2kd√
q
+ 2d
√
ǫ
)2
<
(
4d
√
ǫ
)2
=
(
4d
√
τ
4d
√
2
)2
=
τ
2
.
Therefore, for every β the coefficient f̂ϕ(β) is not τ -heavy for any noticeable τ . This gives the required
contradiction and so we conclude that ϕ is affine.
6.1 ǫ-concentrated functions
Proposition 23 shows that if f is concentrated (and far from constant) and f ◦ ϕ has significant coeffi-
cients, then ϕ is affine. It is natural to wonder whether the condition that f is concentrated is necessary.
In fact, the result cannot be weakened in general: if ϕ(x) = g(x)/h(x) is non-affine and invertible
almost everywhere (such as a Mo¨bius function ϕ(x) = (ax + b)/(cx + d) where ad − bc = 1) then
f(x) = χα(x) + χβ(ϕ
−1(x)) is such that f(x) has a significant coefficient at α and f ◦ ϕ has a
significant coefficient at β.
However, a version of Proposition 23 is true for some non-concentrated functions of interest. Since
Theorem 16 does not require the function to be concentrated, it is of interest to also show that composing
with non-affine ϕ(x) is an obstruction to the solution to CM-HNP for these functions as well. Hence,
for the rest of this section we consider a ‘noisy character’, f(x) := ω
αx+e(x)
N . We first show that these
functions have a significant coefficient, then we show that f ◦ ϕ does not have a significant coefficient
when ϕ is not affine.
To formalise the problem we think of e(x) as a random variable from some distribution (e.g., a
discrete Gaussian or a uniform distribution on some small interval compared with N ). We treat e(x) as
being independent of x, in which case we can write
f̂(β) = E
(
ω
αx−βx+e(x)
N
)
= E
(
ω
(α−β)x
N ω
e(x)
N
)
= E
(
ω
(α−β)x
N
)
E
(
ω
e(x)
N
)
.
To show that |f̂(α)| is large it suffices to give a lower bound for ∣∣E (ωe(x)N )∣∣. We do this by following
an argument due to Bleichenbacher [8].
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Bleichenbacher defines the bias of a random variable X on Z as
BN (X) = E
(
exp(2πiX/N)
)
.
Assume X is the uniform distribution in some interval [0, T − 1] for some 0 < T ≤ N . Then
BUN (X) := BN (X) =
1
T
∑
0≤x<T
exp(2πix/N) .
Some properties of BUN (X) appear in Lemma 1 of [13]. Since the latter is a geometrical progression,
BUN (X) =
1
T
sin(πT/N)
sin(πN)
.
Suppose e(x) follows the uniform distribution X. That is, for each x ∈ ZN the value e(x) is chosen
uniformly and independently at random in [0, T − 1]. From linearity it is easy to see that
E
(
ω
e(x)
N
)
=
1
N
∑
x∈ZN
(
exp(2πie(x)/N)
)
=
N/T
N
∑
0≤t<T
exp(2πit/N) =
1
T
∑
0≤t<T
exp(2πit/N) = BUN (X) .
It is obvious that if T = N then BUN (X) = 0. In applications e(x) usually represents some given
bits, and so it is natural to restrict T ≤ N/2 as we do, though the following argument also holds
given a “fraction of a bit”, i.e. for T > N/2. For T ≤ N/2 one has9 |BUN (X)| > 0.5, and so∣∣E (ωe(x)N )∣∣2 = |BUN (X)|2 > 0.25. The desired lower bound is provided.
A similar approach holds when e follows a Gaussian distribution. In this case the size of the bias
is even larger, as e(x) = 0 on a large set (and e(x) is small on an even larger set) and so most of the
“energy” is distributed around zero.
Hence, we have established that a noisy character has a significant coefficient. Finally, we address
the result of Proposition 23 for such a function.
Claim 24. Let ϕ be as in Proposition 23, and let e(x) given by the uniform distribution (over some
interval in ZN ) or by a Gaussian distribution. If fϕ(x) := ω
ϕ(x)+e(x)
N has a significant coefficient then
ϕ(x) = ax+ b for some a, b ∈ ZN .
Proof sketch. We observe that for every β
f̂ϕ(β) = E
(
ω
ϕ(x)−βx+e(x)
N
)
= E
(
ω
ψβ
1
(x)
N ω
e(x)
N
)
= E
(
ω
ψβ
1
(x)
N
)
E
(
ω
e(x)
N
)
,
where ψβ1 (x) = ϕ(x)− βx. Since
∣∣∣E(ωe(x)N ) ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, it suffices to upper-bound ∣∣∣E(ωψβ1 (x)N ) ∣∣∣. Such a
bound follows from Lemma 22 in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 23.
9See [13, Table 1] for some values |BUN (X)| for different T ≤ N/2.
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6.2 Hidden number problem in subgroups
Another limitation on the applications of the SFT algorithm is the following. Suppose that the multipli-
ers in the hidden number problem are drawn from some set H ⊆ G. One can consider the multipliers
to be in a proper subgroup H < G, as done in [22, 45]. It is not clear how to apply the SFT algorithm
to solve this variant of the (chosen-multiplier) hidden number problem. Specifically, the chosen queries
in the algorithm have to be correlated, but it is not guaranteed that these correlated queries will all lie in
the same subgroup. If the index [G : H] is small (e.g., [G : H] = 2, as in the case of the set of squares
in F∗p) then the issue can be managed, but if [G : H] is large then no results are known. Therefore,
for results (on Diffie–Hellman related schemes) that rely on advice of the form of discrete logarithms
to some base g (as in [2, 12, 46]), if g generates a relatively small subgroup, it is not guaranteed that
the desired correlated multipliers are indeed in the group generated by g. This restricts, for example,
the result given in [2, Section 5]. This observation is similar to the one in [44, Section 2.5], and was
handled in [10, Section 5] and [14, 4.1] since the set of squares in F∗p has index 2 in F
∗
p.
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